On March 25, 2025, Delaware Governor Matt Meyer signed into law sweeping amendments to the State’s corporate code. Given that most public companies are incorporated in Delaware, these changes will have a wide-reaching impact on corporations and shareholders alike.
Supporters of the amendments argue that the reforms are necessary to promote greater predictability and consistency in corporate transactions and to counter mounting criticisms—including from high-profile figures like Elon Musk—that Delaware’s laws and courts have become hostile to business, driving companies to re-incorporate in more business-friendly jurisdictions.
Opponents, however, view the law as a significant rollback of shareholder protections, warning that it shifts Delaware toward a “buyer beware” regime and undermines the state’s longstanding reputation for balancing corporate and shareholder interests.
We sat down with Nathaniel Orenstein, head of Berman Tabacco’s Shareholder Rights and Corporate Governance practice to talk about the changes and the expected impact for the firm’s institutional clients.
BT: Nathaniel, you have been litigating in Delaware Chancery Court for many years, what is your main takeaway from the new amendments?
NATHANIEL ORENSTEIN: The most significant paradigm shift concerns the treatment of related-party transactions—specifically transactions between a company and its controlling stockholder. Historically, the Delaware Court of Chancery exercised its equitable jurisdiction to evaluate these transactions, focusing on whether they were fair and whether they replicated arms-length agreements.
Under the amended law, however, a conflicted transaction “may not be the subject of equitable relief or an award of damages” if it falls within one of several designated safe-harbors. These safe harbors include: approval by a fully informed committee of the board with at least one “independent” member; approval by minority stockholders; or the transaction itself is fair.
This is a major change.
BT: You put the term “independent” in air quotes. In many derivative actions you examine board-level decisions, actions, and inactions through the lens of identifying which directors are truly independent from controlling stockholders, founders, or management. Does the new law modify the definition or analysis of “independent” directors?
NATHANIEL ORENSTEIN: Yes, the recent amendments will significantly reshape how director independence is assessed in Delaware. Historically, the Delaware Court of Chancery examined both formal and informal factors—such as personal relationships, financial interests, and business ties—to determine whether a director was truly independent.
The new law changes that approach dramatically. It establishes a presumption of independence for directors of publicly-listed companies who are not parties to the transaction and who meet the independence standards of the stock exchange on which their company is listed. Overcoming this presumption will now require “substantial, particularized facts” showing that a director either has a material interest in the transaction or a material relationship with someone who does.
Perhaps most strikingly, approval by a single independent director may now be enough to approve or ratify a related-party transaction—a sharp departure from Delaware’s traditionally more cautious scrutiny of conflicts.
BT: Over the past decade, our clients have increasing turned to “Section 220” Books and Records demands to inspect corporate records before deciding on whether to pursue litigation for breach of fiduciary duties. How will the new law impact such Books and Record demands?
NATHANIEL ORENSTEIN: The amendments introduce a significant shift in the scope of documents available through a stockholder’s Section 220 demand under Delaware law. Going forward, stockholders will generally be limited to obtaining formal board materials from the past three years — including meeting minutes, board presentations, and agendas.
Previously, stockholders could often obtain a broader range of documents, including older records and informal communications such as emails and board-level discussions. Under the new law, access to such informal materials will be sharply restricted. Stockholders will now need to demonstrate a “compelling need” with “clear and convincing evidence” to obtain anything beyond formal board materials.
This change raises the bar substantially for stockholders seeking to investigate potential wrongdoing or mismanagement.
BT: While you spoke of related-party transactions above, what about the unique situation of a publicly-traded company seeking to “go private” in a sale to the current CEO: does the new law add additional safe-harbor protections to directors contemplating such potentially conflicted transactions?
NATHANIEL ORENSTEIN: This is an interesting category. While the new law creates a safe-harbor for most related-party transactions, it preserves a distinct two-step safe harbor for interested-party going-private transactions. That process requires (a) approval by a fully informed committee of the board with at least one independent director; and (b) approval by a majority of the disinterested stockholders.
BT: For institutional investors who invest billions of dollars in Delaware registered companies, what are the biggest wins and losses from this new law?
NATHANIEL ORENSTEIN: I’m not seeing any wins for investors under the new law. While the new law takes away stockholder rights generally, limits their ability to investigate wrongdoing, and raises the bar for establishing that a director is not independent, the most profound changes impact stockholder recourse in related-party transactions. Under the new law, controlling stockholders will be able to structure transactions with their controlled companies that benefit themselves—often at the expense of the company— while avoiding meaningful judicial review. Thus, whether a controlling stockholder sells assets to the controlled company at an inflated price, purchases assets at a low price, or otherwise uses their control to benefit themselves at the expense of ordinary stockholders, institutional stockholders will have limited recourse to police these transactions.